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This article examines the High Court decisions in Re Z (A Child) and Re X (A Child)
(Surrogacy: Time Limit), which concerned two of the conditions for the granting of ‘parental
orders’ after surrogacy in section 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. The
article observes that the strict approach employed in Re Z to the interpretation of the
requirement that an application be made by ‘two people’ in section 54(1), contrasts with the
‘liberal’ approach taken in previous cases, including Re X, concerning the six-month ‘time
limit’ during which applications ‘must’ be made in section 54(3). This article suggests that the
judgments do not fully engage with this divergence, instead presenting the different approaches
as an uncontroversial matter of statutory interpretation. The article argues that these different
outcomes can be explained by the continuing policy significance of the two-parent model
within the attribution of legal parenthood in cases of assisted reproduction. The article
concludes that the contrasting and contradictory reasoning of these decisions illustrates the
need for wholesale legislative reforms of surrogacy arrangements.
Introduction
The legal regime regulating surrogacy in the UK remains restrictive,1 as surrogacy continues to
be regulated by the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (the 1985 Act), which renders ‘surrogacy
arrangements’ unenforceable2 and prohibits commercial surrogacy.3 The Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act 2008 (the 2008 Act),4 provides the statutory framework for determining
legal parenthood in all cases of assisted reproduction.5 The 2008 Act governs the process of
* Lecturer in Law, Abertay University, a.brown@abertay.ac.uk. I would like to thank Lynsey Mitchell, Rhonda Powell,
Philip Bremner, Michelle Weldon-Johns and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
paper. Any errors that remain are my own.
1 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘Outsourcing Ethical Dilemmas: Regulating International Surrogacy Arrangements’ (2016) 24(1) Medical
Review Law 59, at p 61, observes that, ‘the legislative framework for recognising a birth through a surrogacy arrangement
is highly restrictive’.
2 Section 1A.
3 Section 2, the operation of a commercial surrogacy agency is an ‘offence’, s 2(2).
4 This is amending legislation, designed to ‘modernise’ the original Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (the 1990
Act). For academic critique of the 2008 Act, see, for example, M Fox, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008:
Tinkering at the Margins’ (2009) 17(3) Feminist Legal Studies 333.
5 Section 33 defines ‘mother’ on the basis of gestation, ‘father’ is defined in ss 35–37 with different conditions depending
upon whether the father is married to the mother, and ss 42–44 defines ‘female parenthood’ in cases involving a female
same-sex couple, using similar rules as those for ‘fathers’.
23
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applying for ‘parental orders’;6 the order through which legal parenthood is transferred from
the surrogate mother (and potentially her husband)7 to the intended parents, without the need
to go through the full adoption process.8
The 1985 Act was based upon the report of the Warnock Committee,9 which was completely
opposed to surrogacy and expressed this disapproval in avowedly moral terms, stating: ‘[e]ven
in compelling medical circumstances the danger of exploitation of one human being by another
appears . . . far to outweigh the potential benefits, in almost every case’.10 Over thirty years
after the passage of the 1985 Act, the legal regime continues to be underpinned by this
unfavourable conception of surrogacy and, as Amel Alghrani and Danielle Griffiths observe,
‘since 1985, the law governing surrogacy has developed in a haphazard fashion and piecemeal
changes made over the years have resulted in a regulatory framework that is contradictory and
confusing for all involved’.11 In spite of this background, in recent years12 there has been
evidence of increasing incidences of surrogacy,13 with particular growth observed in inter-
national surrogacy.14 This rise of surrogacy arrangements suggests that the legislative approach,
underpinned by moral disapproval, is no longer representative of contemporary social attitudes
towards the desirability of surrogacy15 and therefore may no longer be fit for purpose in 21st
century UK society. The continual growth in the practice of surrogacy lends support to the idea
that overarching reform of the legal regulation of surrogacy should be undertaken.16 Indeed,
the Law Commission has recently announced the inclusion of surrogacy within its 13th
Programme of Law Reform,17 commenting that, ‘[w]e take the view that the law relating to
surrogacy is outdated and unclear, and requires comprehensive reform’.18
Due to the existence of this restrictive regulatory regime, the consequences of surrogacy within
the wider regulation of assisted reproduction have not necessarily or regularly been afforded
significant consideration within legislative reforms. Sally Sheldon and Kirsty Horsey have
observed that, ‘[t]he law relating to the attribution of legal parenthood is poorly designed to
6 Section 54; these provisions were further amended by Sch 1 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders)
Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/985) (the 2010 Regulations).
7 Section 35(1).
8 Section 54(1) states, ‘[o]n an application made by two people (“the applicants”), the court may make an order providing
for a child to be treated in law as the child of the applicants’.
9 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, Cm 9314 (1984), available at:
www.bioeticacs.org/iceb/documentos/Warnock_Report_of_the_Committee_of_Inquiry_into_Human_
Fertilisation_and_Embryology_1984.pdf.
10 Ibid, at para 8.17.
11 A Alghrani and D Griffiths, ‘The regulation of surrogacy in the United Kingdom: the case for reform’ [2017] CFLQ 165, at
p 166.
12 Official figures regarding the number of surrogacies are difficult to obtain due to the unregulated nature of surrogacy. The
non-profit organisation Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy (COTS) states it has been involved in over 1000
surrogate births since 1988, available at: www.surrogacy.org.uk/aboutsurrogacy.
13 M Crawshaw, E Blyth and O van den Akker, ‘The Changing Profile of Surrogacy in the UK – Implications for National and
International Policy and Practice’ (2012) 34(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 267, at p 269, present data based
on correspondence with the General Register Office, showing that there has been a sharp increase in the number of parental
orders granted in the UK, with 149 in 2011 compared to 51 in 2007.
14 Ibid, at 271, the authors note that in 2011 26% of parental orders in England and Wales involved a child who had been
born abroad, compared to only 2% in 2008.
15 See, for example, K Horsey, ‘Surrogacy in the UK: Myth Busting and Reform: Report of the Surrogacy UK Working Group
on Surrogacy Law Reform’ (Surrogacy UK, November 2015), paras 3.1–3.2, at pp 19–25, which provides data regarding
the attitudes of those involved in surrogacy arrangements, available at: www.surrogacyuk.org/Downloads/Surrogacy%20
in%20the%20UK%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
16 For recent academic calls for reform, see, for example, K Horsey, ‘Challenging presumptions: legal parenthood and
surrogacy arrangements’ [2010] CFLQ 449.
17 Thirteenth Programme of Law Reform, Law Com No 377 (TSO, 2017).
18 Ibid, para 2.44, at p 21.
24 Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 30, No 1, 2018
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respond to surrogacy arrangements’.19 This article focuses upon one aspect of that attribution
in cases of surrogacy, the provisions of section 54 of the 2008 Act, which govern applications
for ‘parental orders’. Section 54 sets out the various conditions that are required to be satisfied
for the court to make a parental order;20 this article argues that the judicial interpretation of
these conditions continues to be situated within a binary, two-parent model of legal parent-
hood. In recent years, a series of cases have come before the High Court concerning the
interpretation of these conditions,21 with the judiciary generally employing what Mary
Welstead has described as ‘a liberal interpretation of the current law’.22 This article will
consider some of these recent cases, focusing on the judicial interpretation of two of the
conditions for the granting of a ‘parental order’: the six-month ‘time limit’ during which
applications ‘must’ be made, in section 54(3);23 and the requirement that the application be
‘made by two people’, in section 54(1).24 The article focuses upon these two conditions because
in his decisions in Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit)25 and Re Z (A Child),26 the
President of the Family Division, Sir James Munby, employs contrasting approaches, on the
basis of questionable reasoning, to reach different conclusions on the interpretation of these
two conditions. Therefore, these two decisions encapsulate the problems caused by the High
Court’s approach to the interpretation of section 54 and illustrate the continuing and pervasive
influence of the binary, two-parent model on that judicial approach.
The argument advanced in this article has two strands: (1) that the reasoning of the judgments
of Sir James Munby P in Re Z and Re X is inconsistent and the language used within the
judgments is contradictory and, at times, incoherent; and (2) that the distinction between the
judgments in Re X and Re Z can be explained by the binary, two-parent model of legal
parenthood continuing to inform the policy underpinning the 2008 Act’s approach to the
attribution of legal parenthood in all cases of assisted reproduction. The article will conclude by
suggesting that the inconsistencies of the judgments in these cases provides further evidence of
the need for overarching and fundamental legislative reform of the regulation of surrogacy.
The judicial interpretation of the conditions for granting parental orders
Before examining the approach of the courts to the interpretation of section 54(3) and (1), it is
necessary to set out the legislative context in which the provisions of section 54 are considered
by the courts. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Order) Regulations 2010
(the 2010 Regulations)27 imported section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 200228 into
19 K Horsey and S Sheldon, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’ (2012) 20(1) Medical Law
Review 67, at p 87.
20 Section 54(2)–(8).
21 See, for example, A v P (Surrogacy: Parental Order: Death of Applicant) [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam), [2012] Fam 188,
which considered the interpretation of ss 54(4) and (5). Moreover, there have been a series of cases considering the meaning
of ‘expenses reasonably incurred’ in s 54(8), including Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), [2009]
Fam 71; Re X and Y (Parental Order: Retrospective Authorisation of Payments) [2011] EWHC 3147 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR
1347; Re D and L (Surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631 (Fam), [2013] 2 FLR 275 and J v G (Parental Orders) [2013] EWHC
1432 (Fam), [2014] 1 FLR 297. See further C Fenton-Glynn, ‘Outsourcing Ethical Dilemmas: Regulating International
Surrogacy Arrangements’ (2016) 24(1) Medical Review Law 59.
22 M Welstead, ‘Surrogacy Update: Part 2’ [2015] Fam Law 1103, at 1107. See further C Fenton-Glynn, ‘The Regulation and
recognition of surrogacy under English law: an overview of the case law’ [2015] CFLQ 83.
23 Section 54(3) states, ‘the applicants must apply for the order during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on
which the child is born’.
24 Section 54(1) states, ‘[o]n an application made by two people (“the applicants”)’.
25 [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186.
26 [2015] EWFC 73, [2015] 1 WLR 4993.
27 Schedule 1.
28 Section 1(2) states, ‘[t]he paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child’s welfare, throughout
his life’.
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section 54 of the 2008 Act.29 Consequently, the ‘welfare of the child’ became the court’s
‘paramount consideration’ in any determination of an application for a parental order.30 As a
result of these regulations, in Re L (A Child) (Surrogacy: Parental Order),31 Hedley J stated
that, ‘[t]he effect of that must be to weight the balance between public policy considerations
and welfare . . . decisively in favour of welfare. It must follow that it will only be in the clearest
case of the abuse of public policy that the court will be able to withhold an order if otherwise
welfare considerations support its making’.32 This reference to ‘the clearest case of the abuse of
public policy’ was repeated in subsequent cases33 and represents the only circumstances in
which a parental order will be refused.34 Therefore, as Claire Fenton-Glynn observes, judges
‘have been set an impossible task by the legislature, asked to achieve a balance between public
policy and child welfare, while simultaneously being told that there can be no balance due to
the paramountcy of the children’s interests’.35 It is in this context, where the ‘welfare of the
child’ is the court’s paramount consideration and it is highly unlikely that an application will be
refused on general public policy grounds, that decisions concerning applications for parental
orders are situated. The role of welfare in these decisions prompted the Law Commission to
observe that, ‘courts have struggled to implement the statutory conditions for a Parental Order
because the paramount position of the child’s best interests makes it difficult for the court to
refuse to recognise an existing relationship between the intended parents and child’.36 Indeed, it
is arguable that the welfare principle, imported by secondary legislation, should not be able to
defeat the explicit terms of the 2008 Act; without greater clarity, it is constitutionally
questionable that Parliament would be considered to have given the minister the power to alter
the primary text of the statute.37 Moreover, it appears that judges have not grasped the
significance of the constitutional limitations (which should have applied) to the use of ‘welfare’
in this context.38
The ‘Six Month Time Limit’: Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit)39
Section 54(3) of the 2008 Act states: ‘the applicants must apply for the order during the period
of 6 months beginning with the day on which the child is born’. The word ‘must’ suggests that
this is a requirement. Judicial interpretation of this provision appeared to be settled: the
six-month period was described in the High Court as ‘non-extendable’,40 ‘incapable of
enlargement’41 and ‘mandatory’.42 The position was seen as uncontroversial, such that in J v G
29 Section 55(1) of the 2008 Act grants the Secretary of State the power to make regulations which provide, ‘for any provision
of the enactments about adoption to have effect, with such modifications (if any) as may be specified in the regulations, in
relation to orders under section 54’. It is through this provision that the ‘welfare test’ has been imported into the 2008 Act.
30 Prior to the 2010 Regulations, in Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), [2009] Fam 71, at [10],
Hedley J had stated that, ‘welfare considerations cannot be paramount but, of course, are important’.
31 [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam), [2011] Fam 106.
32 Ibid, at [10].
33 See, for example, J v G (Parental Orders) [2013] EWHC 1432 (Fam), [2014] 1 FLR 297, per Theis J, at [20].
34 It is not necessarily clear from these judgments (or subsequent decisions where parental orders have been granted in a wide
range of cases) what sort of circumstances the court envisages would amount to ‘the clearest case of abuse of public policy’,
such as to justify the refusal to grant a parental order.
35 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘The regulation and recognition of surrogacy under English law: an overview of the case law’ [2015]
CFLQ 83, at p 95.
36 Thirteenth Programme of Law Reform, Law Com No 377 (TSO, 2017), para 2.42, at p 21.
37 The use of so-called ‘Henry VIII’ clauses (in which ministers are explicitly given the power to alter primary legislation) in
secondary legislation is constitutionally contentious, see for example AW Bradley, KD Ewing and CJS Knight, Constitu-
tional and Administrative Law (Pearson, 16th edn, 2015), at pp 586–587. However, s 55 of the 2008 Act does not even
appear to explicitly give the minister the power to alter the text of the primary legislation, but nevertheless the judicial
interpretation of the 2010 Regulations appears to have had this consequence.
38 I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point.
39 [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186.
40 Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), [2009] Fam 71, per Hedley J, at [12].
41 Re S (Parental Order) [2009] EWHC 2977 (Fam), [2010] 1 FLR 1156, per Hedley J, at [9].
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Click here to return to Main Contents
Watermark hook
Letterpart Ltd • Typeset in XML • Division: CFLQ_2018_01_Articles • Sequential 24
Letterpart
Lim
ited
•
Size:247m
m
x
185m
m
•
D
ate:M
arch
15,
2018
•
Tim
e:14:5
L
(Parental Orders),43 Theis J observed that, ‘parental order applications must be made within
six months of the child’s birth, there is no power vested in the court to extend that period’44
and in JP v LP and Others (Surrogacy Arrangement: Wardship),45 Eleanor King J stated that,
‘[t]here is no provision within the Act to provide for a discretionary extension to the statutory
time limit’.46 These decisions show that the language of section 54(3) was understood by the
judiciary to be clear and unambiguous and the provision was considered to be a mandatory
statutory requirement and, as such, parental orders could not be issued if the six-month period
had expired prior to the application being made.
However, this position was reversed by the judgment of Munby P in Re X (A Child) (Parental
Order: Time Limit).47 This case concerned a surrogacy arrangement entered into in India; the
child (X), who was conceived using the sperm of the intended father and eggs donated by a
third party,48 was born in 2011 and subsequently entered the UK over 18 months later, in 2013,
on a British passport.49 By this point, the six-month time limit set out in section 54(3) had long
since elapsed, and at the date of the hearing X was 2 years and 2 months old, the parents
apparently having been unaware of the requirement for a parental order.50 In spite of the
seemingly unambiguous statutory language of section 54(3) and the approach consistently
adopted by other judges in previous High Court decisions, the President granted the order.51
This change of judicial interpretation caused Welstead to comment that, ‘the decision in Re X
suggests that there is more than an element of judicial creativity on the part of Munby J in his
determination to ameliorate the constraints of s 54 and ensure the future familial relationship
of X with his intended parents’.52
This ‘creativity’ is particularly evident from the approach taken to statutory interpretation in
Re X.53 The judgment places significant reliance upon the fact that the purpose of the statutory
provision was not considered or discussed in the parliamentary debates regarding either the
1990 Act or the 2008 Act, with Munby P observing that, ‘[i]t is apparent from counsel’s
researches that in neither House was there any explanation of or discussion about the terms of
section 30(2), now section 54(3)’.54 Expanding upon the significance of this lack of parliamen-
tary discussion or explanation for the provision in Re X, the President stated:
‘Parliament has not explained its thinking, but given the transcendental importance of a
parental order, with its consequences stretching many, many decades into the future, can it
sensibly be thought that Parliament intended the difference between six months and six
42 JP v LP and Others (Surrogacy Arrangement: Wardship) [2014] EWHC 595 (Fam), [2015] 1 FLR 307, per King J, at [29].
43 [2013] EWHC 1432 (Fam), [2014] 1 FLR 297.
44 Ibid, at [29]. See further the very similar form of words used by the same judge in Re WT (Foreign Surrogacy) [2014]
EWHC 1303 (Fam), [2015] 1 FLR 960, at [42].
45 [2014] EWHC 595 (Fam), [2015] 1 FLR 307.
46 Ibid, at [29].
47 [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186.
48 Ibid, at [3].
49 Ibid, at [4].
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid, at [2].
52 M Welstead, ‘Surrogacy: One More Nail in the Coffin’ [2014] Fam Law 1637, at p 1639.
53 The President’s reasoning was heavily reliant upon the line of authority concerning the breach of statutory procedural
requirements, beginning with Howard v Bodington (1877) 2 PD 203 and more recently considered by the House of Lords
in R v Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2006] 1 AC 340. The President quoted from the judgment of Sir Stanley Burnton in
Newbold v The Coal Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 584, [2014] 1 WLR 1288, which stated, at [70]: ‘In all such cases, it is
necessary to consider the words of the statute . . . in the light of its subject matter, the background, the purpose of the
requirement, if that is known or determined, and the actual or possible effect of non-compliance on the parties. We assume
that Parliament in the case of legislation . . . would have intended a sensible . . . result’.
54 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, at [16]. Or as was expressed
subsequently by Theis J in Re A and B (Parental Order) [2015] EWHC 2080 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 446, at [39], ‘the lack of
detail as to the underlying policy or rationale for the six month time limit in s 54(3)’.
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months and one day to be determinative and one day’s delay to be fatal? I assume that
Parliament intended a sensible result. Given the subject matter, given the consequences for
the commissioning parents, never mind those for the child, to construe section 54(3) as
barring forever an application made just one day late is not, in my judgment, sensible. It is
the very antithesis of sensible; it is almost nonsensical.’55
The use of this justification for granting the parental order is striking, because in the factual
circumstances of Re X the application had not been made for a period that was several times
longer than the six-month period, rather than ‘one day late’, but this distinction is not subjected
to significant consideration or interrogation within the judgment.56 As Philip Bremner observes,
‘Munby P’s reasoning . . . relies heavily on the nature of a parental order and the effect it has on
all the parties’.57 However, the approach to statutory interpretation employed by the President
in this judgment,58 particularly the manner in which the lack of expressed parliamentary
intention is utilised, is far from uncontentious.59 Kenneth Norrie has commented that the
President’s decision, ‘effectively leaves the provision meaningless, contrary to another well-
established rule of statutory interpretation, that statutory language needs to be considered in
such a way as gives it some substantive effect. To hold that “must” means “may” means that
“must” means nothing at all’.60
In addition, the President stated that his conclusion was also justified on the basis that
section 54(3) could be ‘read down’61 in terms of section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.62
The judgment explicitly endorses the reasoning of A v P (Surrogacy: Parental Order: Death of
Applicant),63 a case which concerned the death of one of the applicants before the parental
order was made, but after the application had been sought.64 In granting the order Theis J
stated, ‘[t]he primary aim of s 54 is to allow an order to be made which has a transformative
effect on the legal relationship between the child and the applicants’.65 It is clear throughout the
cases concerning applications for parental orders that this ‘transformative effect’ is at the
forefront of judicial reasoning. Building on this in Re X, Munby P emphasised the centrality of
recognising the ‘identity’ of the child, commenting that, ‘[s]ection 54 goes to the most
55 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, at [55].
56 Ibid, at [64], Munby P acknowledges that, ‘[i]n one sense that is a long time, both in absolute terms and when compared
with the statutory time limit of six months’. However, the longer time period is not apparently considered significant within
his reasoning.
57 P Bremner, ‘Surrogacy and Single Parents Following Re Z’ (2017) 21(2) Edinburgh Law Review 281, at p 285.
58 The procedural requirements considered in cases in the Howard v Bodington (1877) 2 PD 203 line of authority have tended
to be much more complex and opaque than the provisions of s 54(3), such that the President’s utilisation of those cases as
one of the bases for his decision appears somewhat questionable.
59 The problematic assumption which underpins the President’s reasoning is that due to the ‘transcendental importance’ of the
parental order to recognising the identity and securing the welfare of the child, Parliament would not have ‘sensibly’
intended total invalidity if the six-month period was not complied with. However, it is far from clear that the time limit
should not be understood in the context of the overwhelmingly prohibitive approach taken to surrogacy by the 1985 and
1990 Acts. Therefore, the lack of clearly expressed parliamentary intention may simply have reflected the fact that
Parliament believed the purpose of this provision was to contribute to the discouraging of surrogacy arrangements, through
the imposition of a strict time limit for applications.
60 K Norrie, ‘English and Scottish adoption orders and British parental orders after surrogacy: welfare, competence and
judicial legislation’ [2017] CFLQ 93, at p 100.
61 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, at [58].
62 Section 3(1) states: ‘So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given
effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’.
63 [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam), [2012] Fam 188.
64 Ibid, at [6]–[7].
65 Ibid, at [24].
28 Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 30, No 1, 2018
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fundamental aspects of status and, transcending even status, to the very identity of the child as
a human being: who he is and who his parents are. It is central to his being, whether as an
individual or as a member of his family’.66
It is clear that accurately recognising the ‘status’ and ‘identity’ of X was a central feature of the
President’s reasoning and that a parental order was viewed as the only way through which such
recognition could be achieved. However, as Robert Lee and Derek Morgan suggest, ‘[t]he
question of genetic status and personal identity is a complex, intermeshing construct of
psychological, philosophical, historical, cultural, ethical and legal metrics’.67 In this and other
judgments parental orders are being granted an almost mythic (‘transcendental’)68 capacity as a
method of recognising and recording the identity of children. I suggest that this understanding
of the parental order is highly contestable. It is unclear the extent to which a legal order, that
does not even attempt to recognise the full extent of the child’s identity (as there is no record
required of the sperm or egg donors that may be involved in conception), is capable of serving
the ‘transformative’ function that the judgments are suggesting it serves.69 Instead, ‘identity’ is
being conflated in the judgments with recognition within a two-parent, nuclear family, which is
what a parental order provides to the child and the intended parents.70
Subsequent cases considering section 54(3)
The President emphasised at the conclusion of his judgment that: ‘I intend to lay down no
principle beyond that which appears from the authorities’.71 However, his approach has been
followed in all subsequent reported decisions concerning applications for parental orders
outside of the six-month period;72 this is unsurprising, because as Fenton-Glynn comments,
‘there was nothing unique about this case that would make it distinguishable from the many
hundreds of other surrogacy cases that go through the courts each year’.73 Most striking of the
reported decisions are A v C,74 where parental orders were granted for three children, a
13-year-old and 12-year-old twins, and Re A and B (Children),75 where parental orders were
granted for two children who were 8 years, 3 months, and 5 years 8 months old at the time of
the court hearing.76 The judgment in Re A makes clear that as a consequence of the decision in
Re X, ‘s 54(3) should be read as a directive rather than a mandatory deadline and that the court
had the power to extend it where the facts demanded that such a discretion should be
exercised’.77 Given the approach taken in the subsequent reported cases and the paramountcy
of the ‘welfare of the child’ in these decisions, it appears that the facts will ‘demand’ that this
66 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, at [59].
67 RG Lee and D Morgan, Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Regulating the Reproductive Revolution (Blackstone, 2001),
at p 217.
68 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, per Munby P, at [55].
69 This argument should not be understood as suggesting that parental orders lack legal significance for intended parents, but
rather that the impact of the order is more limited than the ‘transcendental’ language of the judgments suggests. I would like
to thank Phillip Bremner for highlighting this point.
70 There is substantial literature on the complex interaction between law and identity in the context of assisted reproduction,
see for example A Diduck, ‘If only we can find the appropriate terms to use the issue will be solved’: Law, identity and
parenthood’ [2007] CFLQ 458, A Bainham, ‘Arguments About Parentage’ (2008) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 322 and
J Fortin, ‘Children’s right to know their origins – too far, too fast?’ [2009] CFLQ 336.
71 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, per Munby P, at [69].
72 See, for example, AB v CT (Parental Order: Consent of Surrogate Mother) [2015] EWFC 12, [2016] 1 FLR 41 and Re A
and B (Parental Order) [2015] EWHC 2080 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 446.
73 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘The Difficulty of Enforcing Surrogacy Regulations’ (2015) 74 Cambridge Law Journal 34, at p 36.
74 [2016] EWFC 42, [2017] 2 FLR 101.
75 [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 530.
76 Ibid, at [1]. As Russell J commented, at [45], ‘[t]here is no shying away from the fact that in this case the time which is
elapsed is much longer than that which was in the contemplation of the President in Re X’.
77 Ibid, per Russell J, at [42].
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discretion be exercised in all but, to quote Hedley J in Re L,78 ‘the clearest case of the abuse of
public policy’,79 which in practice appears highly unlikely to arise. As a consequence of the
decision in Re X the word ‘must’ in section 54(3) is deprived of any meaning,80 and the entire
subsection seemingly no longer has any purpose or effect.81 Kirsty Horsey comments that, ‘it
appears from this decision – and similar others – that, in reality, where it is in the child(ren)’s
best interests, there is now no real-time limit in the law within which a [parental order]
application must be made, making somewhat of a mockery of the provision’.82 Moreover, the
judgment of Russell J in Re A reflects the focus on identity in Re X, stating, ‘only parental
orders will fully recognise the children’s identity as the Applicants’ natural children, rather than
giving them the wholly artificial and, in their case, inappropriate status of adopted children’.83
From these decisions, it is clear that the transformation of the apparently mandatory statutory
time limit into a purely discretionary system is being justified on the basis that parental orders
are the only option which appropriately recognise the identity of the child.
However, a contrasting interpretative approach was taken by Munby P in Re Z (A Child)
(Surrogate Father: Parental Order),84 concerning the statutory requirement that a parental
order can only be applied for by ‘two people’, illustrating the problems caused by ‘judicial-led’
reform of the law in this area.
The requirement for two applicants – Re Z (A Child)85
Section 54(1) of the 2008 Act refers to ‘an application made by two people’. Prior to the
decision concerning the six-month time limit in Re X, this provision had also been interpreted
as being clear and unambiguous; in B v C (Surrogacy: Adoption),86 Theis J stated simply, ‘[a]
single person is therefore unable to apply for a parental order’.87 However, after the judgment
in Re X (and other subsequent decisions) utilised a ‘liberal’88 and ‘purposive’89 interpretation of
section 54(3), in Re Z (A Child)90 the President was invited to ‘read down’ section 54(1) and
grant a parental order to a single applicant. This case concerned a child, Z, who was born in
the USA to a surrogate mother, using the single father’s sperm and a third-party donor’s egg.91
The father obtained a judgment from the US court relieving the surrogate mother of any rights
and responsibilities in relation to Z and establishing his sole parentage of Z.92 However in the
UK, under the terms of the 2008 Act, the surrogate mother is the legal mother and the father
78 Re L (A Child) (Surrogacy: Parental Order) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam), [2011] Fam 106.
79 Ibid, at [10].
80 M Welstead, ‘Surrogacy: One More Nail in the Coffin’ [2014] Fam Law 1637, at p 1637, described the decision in Re X as,
‘hammering the nails into the coffin of s 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008’.
81 The judgments in Re X and other subsequent decisions fail to engage with the argument that this ‘liberal’ or ‘purposive’
interpretation of s 54(3) renders the provision devoid of any meaning, which is a result which surely Parliament cannot
sensibly be understood to have intended, and the impact that this has upon an overall argument partially based upon
interpreting s 54(3) in line with ‘sensible’ parliamentary intention.
82 K Horsey, ‘Fraying at the Edges: UK Surrogacy Law in 2015’ (2016) 24(4) Medical Law Review 608, at p 610.
83 Re A and B (Children) [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 530, at [61].
84 [2015] EWFC 73, [2015] 1 WLR 4993.
85 Ibid.
86 [2015] EWFC 17, [2015] 1 FLR 1392.
87 Ibid, at [20].
88 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, at [64], Munby P observed that, ‘[i]n
these circumstances the court is entitled, indeed in my judgment is bound, to adopt a more liberal and relaxed approach’.
89 See, for example, Re A and B (Parental Order) [2015] EWHC 2080 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 446, at [64], where Theis J stated,
‘[i]n relation to the time limit the President in Re X made it clear a purposive construction can be given to the time
requirement in s 54(3)’.
90 [2015] EWFC 73, [2015] 1 WLR 4993.
91 Ibid, at [2].
92 Ibid.
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did not have parental responsibility for Z.93 In contrast to his decision in Re X, Munby P was
not persuaded that he could depart from the statutory language of section 54(1) and the
application for a parental order was refused. Welstead notes the distinction between the
approaches of his two judgments, stating of Re Z, ‘the decision appears to be a departure from
the previous liberal approach of the judiciary in their interpretation of the surrogacy provisions
of the HFEA 2008’.94 The decision in Re Z is entirely framed in terms of ‘reading down’95 the
statutory provision, under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998,96 whereas in Re X the
judgment was primarily premised on statutory interpretation, with the section 3 arguments
merely a supplementary aspect of the decision.97 Within the judgment in Re Z significant
reference98 is made to the House of Lords decision in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza,99 which
considered the interpretative role of the court under section 3 of the 1998 Act. The President
refers to the judgment of Lord Rodger, who indicated the boundaries of permissible interpreta-
tion, and states: ‘In para 111, he said that section 3(1) gives the court no power to “change
black into white” or to remove “the very core and essence” or “pith and substance” of what
Parliament has enacted’.100 It is certainly arguable that the President’s previous judgment in
Re X sought to change ‘black into white’ in its interpretation of the six-month time limit in
section 54(3); this starkly illustrates the contradictory approaches taken by the two judg-
ments.101
It appears to be crucial within the judgment that, in contrast to Re X, the expressed
parliamentary intention behind this provision could be identified, with the President stating,
‘[t]he principle that only two people – a couple – can apply for a parental order has been a clear
and prominent feature of the legislation throughout’.102 Underpinning this statement, the
judgment quotes extensively from the Public Bill Committee debates on the 2008 Act;
specifically the response of the Minister of State, Dawn Primarolo MP, to a backbench
amendment that sought to allow parental orders for single people, where she stated,
‘[s]urrogacy, however, involves agreeing to hand over a child even before conception. The
Government are still of the view that the magnitude of that means that it is best dealt with by
a couple’.103 This reference to the ‘magnitude’ of surrogacy, when compared to adoption or
IVF, which are both available to single people, is made more than once in the minister’s
statement.104 However, it is far from clear from the statement itself what exactly is meant by
the use of the term ‘magnitude’ in this context, and as Horsey observes, ‘[t]hough it is possible
to see how Munby J felt his hands were tied, the sheer lack of interrogation that these
comments have been subjected to is incredible. It is surely a magnitudinous decision when
people who are not the parents of a child decide to adopt. Yet the government trusts single
93 Ibid, at [3].
94 M Welstead, ‘Surrogacy Reform Due? [2015] Fam Law 1554, at p 1554.
95 For judicial interpretation of s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, see for example Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL
30, [2004] 2 AC 557.
96 As the High Court had previously ‘read down’ for example s 54(4) in A v P (Surrogacy: Parental Order: Death of
Applicant) [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam), [2012] Fam 188. In Re Z (A Child) [2015] EWFC 73, [2015] 1 WLR 4993,
Munby P, at [40], states, ‘nothing I have said is intended to throw any doubt upon the correctness of the decisions . . .
holding that it is permissible to “read down” sections 54(3) and 54(4) of the 2008 Act’.
97 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, at [58]–[61], Munby P stated that he
would have been prepared to read down s 54(3) had he not been able to reach the result following the reasoning on
statutory interpretation.
98 Re Z (A Child) [2015] EWFC 73, [2015] 1 WLR 4993, at [28]–[35].
99 [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557.
100 Re Z (A Child) [2015] EWFC 73, [2015] 1 WLR 4993, at [33].
101 I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this point.
102 Re Z (A Child) [2015] EWFC 73, [2015] 1 WLR 4993, at [36].
103 Dawn Primarolo MP, Hansard, HC Deb, col 249 (12 June 2008).
104 Ibid: ‘[t]hat recognises the magnitude of a situation in which a person becomes pregnant with the express intention of
handing the child over to someone else, and the responsibility that that places on the people who will receive the child’.
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people in this situation, but not following surrogacy’.105 Given the language in the judgments
concerning other conditions in section 54 regarding the ‘transcendental’ importance or
‘transformative’ significance of parental orders, the lack of engagement with, or analysis of, the
language of this ministerial statement in the judgment in Re Z is somewhat surprising.
Nevertheless, on the basis of this parliamentary intention, the President goes on to state that
interpreting section 54(1) in the manner argued for by the applicant, ‘would be to ignore what
is, as it has always been, a key feature of the scheme and scope of the legislation’.106 It is not
immediately clear why, in Re X, the time limit was not similarly considered a ‘key feature of the
scheme and scope of the legislation’.107 Moreover, given the discussion above regarding the lack
of academic consensus that Munby P’s approach to statutory interpretation in Re X was
correct,108 I argue that the complete distinction drawn between the statutory provisions on the
basis of ‘parliamentary intention’ is not as clear-cut as the reasoning of Re Z asserts.
Subsequently, in Re Z (A Child) (No 2),109 the President made a ‘declaration of incompatibil-
ity’110 regarding the requirement for ‘an application made by two people’ in section 54(1).
Therefore, while the President was not prepared to adopt a ‘liberal’ interpretation of the
provision, reflecting his approach in Re X, and grant a parental order to the single applicant in
Re Z, he was prepared to hold that the provision was incompatible with Art 14 in conjunction
with Art 8.111 Indeed, the government conceded this point at the hearing.112 Consequently,
there will be some limited reform made to the regulation of surrogacy; to achieve this, the
government introduced a remedial order in November 2017,113 with the accompanying
ministerial statement noting that: ‘[t]he Government will now introduce legislation to reflect an
equal approach for a single person and couples in obtaining legal parenthood after a surrogacy
arrangement’.114 As well as this, as mentioned above, the Law Commission have included
surrogacy within its upcoming 13th Programme of Law Reform;115 suggesting that proposals
for overarching reform will be forthcoming. However, regardless of the decision in Re Z (No 2)
and this future law reform, the differences between the reasoning of the judgments in Re X and
Re Z and the justifications for the contrasting outcomes continue to merit exploration.
105 K Horsey, ‘Fraying at the Edges: UK Surrogacy Law in 2015’ (2016) 24(4) Medical Law Review 608, at p 617.
106 Re Z (A Child) [2015] EWFC 73, [2015] 1 WLR 4993, at [37].
107 The President’s use of this argument is notable, because another key feature of the amendments in the 2008 Act was the
removal of the reference to ‘the need of that child for a father’ from s 13(5) of the 1990 Act. Therefore, it is certainly
arguable that a ‘key feature of the scheme and scope’ of the 2008 Act is that it enables single women to exercise their
procreative liberty by accessing fertility services and entering into parenthood should they chose to. Thus, it is surprising
that this argument was not explored in the context of s 54(1) and the single male applicant in Re Z. I would like to thank
one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this point.
108 See for example K Horsey, ‘Fraying at the Edges: UK Surrogacy Law in 2015’ (2016) 24(4) Medical Law Review 608 and
K Norrie, ‘English and Scottish adoption orders and British parental orders after surrogacy: welfare, competence and
judicial legislation’ [2017] CFLQ 93.
109 [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam), [2017] Fam 25.
110 Human Rights Act 1998, s 4.
111 Re Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam), [2017] Fam 25, at [19].
112 Ibid, at [12].
113 The remedial order will not address s 54(2)(c), which requires that couples who are neither married nor in a civil
partnership be: ‘two persons who are living as partners in an enduring family relationship’. There remains the possibility
that after the two-person requirement is removed from s 54(1), the legislation will be potentially discriminatory towards
couples who do not meet this ‘enduring family relationship’ threshold. This provides further evidence of the underlying
policy significance of the traditional, binary, two-parent model in the regulation of surrogacy. I would like to thank one of
the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point.
114 Ministerial Statement of Mr Philip Dunne MP, ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: Remedial Order: Written
Statement’, 29 November 2017, HCWS282. At the time of writing, the remedial order has not been passed by Parliament
(it is expected by Summer 2018). Therefore, the difference in reasoning between the President’s judgments is not merely an
academic point, because single applicants remain unable to apply for parental orders, see for example M v F [2017]
EWHC 2176 (Fam), [2017] 3 FCR 511, whereas those couples who apply outside of the statutory ‘time limit’ are now able
to apply.
115 Thirteenth Programme of Law Reform, Law Com No 377 (TSO, 2017).
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The differences in approach and language between the judgments
The distinct (and surprising) lack of interaction between the reasoning of the two judgments is
immediately striking, given the parallels between the two issues being considered and the fact
that both judgments were given by Munby P. Bremner has commented of Re Z that, ‘the High
Court’s decision to make a declaration of incompatibility rather than read down the provision
to make parental orders available to single applicants seems somewhat arbitrary in light of the
court’s willingness to read down the other requirements, in particular the time limits, contained
in section 54 of the 2008 Act’.116 Many of the factors and considerations granted significance
in terms of section 54(3) (‘the welfare of the child’, ‘status’ and ‘identity’) would prima facie
appear to apply with similar force to section 54(1), but not only were these factors not granted
this significance, they were barely considered at all in the judgment in Re Z. Similarly, the
argument that is central to the decision in Re Z, whether the statutory provision can be ‘read
down’ in accordance with the interpretative requirements of section 3 of the Human Rights Act
1998, is considered far more briefly in the judgment in Re X.117 As a consequence of this
disjuncture, the overlap and similarities between the underlying issues raised in these two cases
is obscured and strangely under-explored within the judgment in Re Z. Fenton-Glynn has
previously commented of the cases interpreting section 54, ‘the courts have been willing to read
down the statute to allow flexibility even in the mandatory provisions, if it is necessary to
achieve justice’.118 However, this flexibility was not apparent in Re Z, where the statutory
provision was not read down and the application was not granted.
Moreover, there are notable differences between the judgments considering section 54(3) and
the judgment in Re Z regarding the relationship between a parental order and an adoption
order;119 the judgments in Re X and Re A make clear that only a parental order would be able
to properly reflect the ‘status’ and ‘identity’ of the children, as well as Russell J stating, in Re A,
that adoption would be ‘wholly artificial’ for the children.120 It is notable that this language
fails to engage with the argument that a parental order, a relatively recent legal construct,121 is
also ‘artificial’ in all cases, because there is no ‘natural’ method of recognising parenthood in
surrogacy arrangements, nor in any form of assisted reproduction.122 This language and
reasoning also implies that there is a fundamental substantive difference between parental
orders and adoption orders justifying the departure from the terms of section 54(3), which is
not reflected in the legal substance of those two orders.123 I would not dispute that adoption is
not a tailored solution for children born through surrogacy, due to the factual differences
between the context of a surrogacy arrangement and an adoption. However, given the
similarities between the practical effects of the two orders, I am unsure that the distinction
between the orders justifies the approach taken to the terms of section 54(3) in these
116 P Bremner, ‘Surrogacy and Single Parents Following Re Z’ (2017) 21(2) Edinburgh Law Review 281, at p 282.
117 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, per Munby P, at [60], described his
conclusion on this point as ‘a fortiori’ due to the reasoning of Theis J on ‘reading down’ s 54(4) in A v P (Surrogacy:
Parental Order: Death of Applicant) [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam), [2012] Fam 188.
118 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘The regulation and recognition of surrogacy under English law: an overview of the case law’ [2015]
CFLQ 83, at p 94.
119 The framework for the making of adoption orders is set out in ss 46–51 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.
120 Re A and B (Children) [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 530, at [61].
121 Section 30 of the 1990 Act.
122 This inherent artificiality is why the regimes of the 1990 and 2008 Acts were required; the existing rules of ‘natural’
reproduction were unable to address the issues that arise in the determination of legal parenthood in cases of assisted
reproduction.
123 There are significant differences between the procedural rules concerning parental orders and adoption orders. For
example, adoption is facilitated by local authority ‘adoption agencies’, ss 2–17 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002,
and s 92 prohibits the arranging of ‘private adoptions’; whereas the unenforceability of surrogacy arrangements results in
the absence of any statutory agencies and such arrangements necessarily being conducted between private individuals.
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decisions.124 As Norrie has observed, ‘these distinctions are less significant than they might
appear. They are differences of fact that do not in themselves require to be reflected in different
orders’.125 This lack of substantive difference is recognised by the judgment of Russell J, which
observes that, ‘[i]n many ways in practical terms either parental orders or adoption orders will
resolve the children’s legal position by ensuring their rights to inheritance, pension entitlement,
financial support in the event of their parent’s separation and all other basic entitlements which
flow from them having a legal parent–child relationship with the Applicants’.126 In spite of
acknowledging the lack of practical differences between the orders, Russell J states that, ‘[t]he
orders are not the same, however. Nor are they intended to be as a matter of law and public
policy’.127 This disjuncture within Russell J’s reasoning illustrates how the differences between
the orders is asserted in the judgments as being based on reflecting the ‘status’ and ‘identity’ of
the children, rather than on the substance of the order themselves.128
In his judgment in Re X, the President variously states that section 54 ‘transcends status’,129
refers to ‘the very identity of the child as a human being’130 and that ‘[a]doption is not an
attractive solution given the commissioning father’s existing biological relationship with X’.131
Similar language was used by Russell J in Re A,132 ‘I was reminded and note that parental
orders were created because Parliament, when debating the HFEA 1990, decided that it would
be inappropriate for biological parents to have to adopt their own children. The very existence
of parental orders is a testament to the decision of Parliament that adoption orders do not befit
children born through surrogacy’.133 The language used throughout the judgments considering
applications under section 54 makes clear that the option of an adoption order is understood
judicially as inherently problematic for couples who have undertaken surrogacy arrange-
ments.134 All of these statements appear to apply equally to the factual circumstances of the
single applicant and the child in Re Z as they did to the applicants and the child in Re X and
other such cases. In spite of this the court makes little use of a similar line of reasoning, and
makes at most an unconvincing, under-rationalised attempt to distinguish Re Z from those
cases that previously expanded the discretionary power of judges under section 54.
124 While an adoption order may be an ‘imperfect’ solution for a child born through surrogacy, that does not mean that it is
not the best solution in circumstances when the statutory conditions for the granting of a ‘parental order’ in s 54 are not
satisfied. However, the judgments considering s 54(3) appear to suggest a greater significance for this imperfect nature in
allowing the court to depart from the statutory language.
125 K Norrie, ‘English and Scottish adoption orders and British parental orders after surrogacy: welfare, competence and
judicial legislation’ [2017] CFLQ 93, at p 109.
126 Re A and B (Children) [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 530, at [56]. In A v P (Surrogacy: Parental Order: Death
of Applicant) [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam), [2012] Fam 188, at [30], Theis J commented that ‘[t]he effect of a parental order
is the same as an adoption order’.
127 Re A and B (Children) [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 530, at [56].
128 I accept that there is a conceptual distinction between the adoption process and the process of surrogacy arrangements.
However, the judgments appear to envisage a similar conceptual distinction between adoption orders and parental orders,
without properly engaging with, or fully articulating, the basis on which the orders themselves (rather than the processes)
should be understood as conceptually distinct.
129 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, per Munby P, at [54].
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid, at [7].
132 Re A and B (Children) [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 530.
133 Ibid, at [68].
134 See, for example, A v P (Surrogacy: Parental Order: Death of Applicant) [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam), [2012] Fam 188,
where Theis J commented, at [30], ‘[o]nly a parental order would have the effect of transforming the legal status of the
child such that both commissioning parents are recognised as being the legal parents of the child’.
34 Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 30, No 1, 2018
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While it may be that in Re Z, unlike in Re X,135 the President felt himself to be entirely
constrained by the statutory wording of section 54, the significance granted to the ‘attractive-
ness’ or ‘appropriateness’ of adoption as a solution in cases of surrogacy within the judgments
remains strikingly different.136 Indeed, in Re Z the President comments that:
‘[T]he contrast in this respect – obvious to any knowledgeable critic – between adoption
orders and parental orders, which is a fundamental difference of obvious significance, is
both very striking and, in my judgment, very telling. Surely, it betokens a very clear
difference of policy which Parliament, for whatever reasons, thought it appropriate to draw
both in 1990 and again in 2008. And, as it happens, this is not a matter of mere
speculation or surmise, because we know from what the Minister of State said in 2008 that
this was seen as a necessary distinction based on what were thought to be important points
of principle.’137
Given the comments made previously by the President, and other judges, referring to adoption
as ‘not an attractive solution’,138 ‘wholly artificial’139 or ‘inappropriate’140 in cases regarding
surrogacy, it is surprising that the President in Re Z appears to accept at face value the clear
distinction made by the parliamentary language in the case of single applicants. The central
question raised by this is: if it is ‘inappropriate’ for a couple to ‘adopt their own children’, why
is it not similarly inappropriate for a single applicant to have to do so?141 It is telling that this
issue is not explored in significant detail within the judgment in Re Z. Indeed, it is striking that
in Re Z, the President does not fully consider the relationship between the previous decisions on
section 54(3), particularly the significance given to recognising the ‘status’ and ‘identity’ of the
children, and the circumstances of the single applicant and the child in Re Z. The President
commented in Re X that, ‘a parental order presents the optimum legal and psychological
solution for X and is preferable to an adoption order because it confirms the important legal,
practical and psychological reality of X’s identity: the commissioning father is his biological
father and all parties intended from the outset that the commissioning parents should be his
legal parents’.142 It is difficult to understand how and why those factors were not granted the
same consideration (if not necessarily the same significance in determining the outcome) within
the President’s analysis of the factual circumstances in Re Z.
I would not dispute that the aims of the President in Re X and the other judges who have
followed his reasoning to allow for parental orders to be granted in a wider range of
circumstances appear to be focused upon the best interests of children. As well as this, the
judgments reflect the consensus of both academics143 and other stakeholders144 that the
135 Although, as discussed above, the validity of this explanation is far from uncontested.
136 This incoherency is not overcome by the subsequent ‘declaration of incompatibility’ in Re Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016]
EWHC 1191 (Fam), [2017] Fam 25.
137 Re Z (A Child) [2015] EWFC 73, [2015] 1 WLR 4993, at [36].
138 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, per Munby P, at [7].
139 Re A and B (Children) [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 530, per Russell J, at [61].
140 Ibid.
141 It is worth noting the distinction between the position of the single (father) applicant in Re Z and couple applicants in
other cases. The single father can have his parentage declared under s 55A of the Family Law Act 1986 (an option that is
not available for the female member of the intended parents). Thereafter, the father could acquire parental responsibilities
through an order under s 4(1) of the Children Act 1989, and then consequently be granted a ‘Child Arrangements Order’
in relation to the child’s residence, under s 8. In this way, the purpose of the parental order (or the adoption order) would
be to dislodge the surrogate mother from her parental status, not to replace her with someone else (as it would be in cases
involving couples for the female member of the intended parents). However, this option was not considered by the
President in Re Z. I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point.
142 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] Fam 186, at [7].
143 See, for example, K Horsey and S Sheldon, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’ (2012) 20(1)
Medical Law Review 67 and K Horsey, ‘Challenging presumptions: legal parenthood and surrogacy arrangements’ [2010]
CFLQ 449.
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framework for attributing legal parenthood in cases of surrogacy is in need of fundamental
reform.145 However, normative agreement with the outcomes in these cases should not be
conflated with accepting that the reasoning adopted in the judgments is sound, nor that this
method of ‘reform’ is coherent or principled. As the Law Commission recently noted, ‘courts
have extended or modified many of the statutory requirements for a Parental Order, but case
law has not been able to resolve the underlying problems in the statute, or find solutions to all
difficulties’.146 It is apparent throughout the cases considering section 54 that judicially led
‘quasi-reform’ has been a problematic approach to dealing with the issues that arise in the
context of attributing legal parenthood in cases of surrogacy, because it is inherently ‘case by
case’ and piecemeal. Therefore, there is no scope or opportunity for the necessary wholesale
and overarching reform of the regulation of surrogacy that the Law Commission will be able to
undertake.
The explanation for the divergence between the two decisions offered by the judgment itself, is
that the distinction between the clearly expressed parliamentary language regarding single
applicants and the lack of such ascertainable intention regarding the time limit necessitates the
difference in approach. Consequently, the decision in Re X is able to ignore the seemingly
unambiguous statutory language, while in Re Z the same approach cannot be utilised.
However, as explored above, the President’s approach to statutory interpretation in Re X is
questionable and has not been universally accepted by academic commentators; Norrie has
described it as ‘contrary to [a] well-established rule of statutory interpretation’.147 Therefore, as
Bremner comments, ‘given that the courts have breached a “bright line” rule (in relation to the
six-month time limit) it remains unclear why, and unfortunate that, they did not pursue a
similarly just result in Re Z by creating the facility for full single parenthood by surrogacy’.148
On this basis, if the explanation offered by the judgments themselves is not universally or
uncritically accepted, why then was the President prepared to adopt a ‘creative’ approach to
interpretation in Re X, but not in Re Z? I argue that an explanation for this distinction is
offered by the centrality of the binary, two-parent model, and the traditional, nuclear family
within the policy underpinning the legal regulation of assisted reproduction and surrogacy.
Moreover, I argue that this traditional paradigm of parenthood and family continues to be
promoted by judicial language and decision-making.
The policy significance of the binary, two-parent model within assisted
reproduction and surrogacy
The initial legislation governing the attribution of legal parenthood in cases of assisted
reproduction, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (the 1990 Act) was based
upon the recommendations of the Warnock Committee Report.149 The report was explicit as to
its preferred model of family, stating, ‘we believe that as a general rule it is better for children to
be born into a two-parent family, with both father and mother’.150 Writing in reference to the
1990 Act, Sally Sheldon observed that, ‘[p]arliament attempted to foresee every possible
144 See, for example, K Horsey, ‘Surrogacy in the UK: Myth Busting and Reform: Report of the Surrogacy UK Working Group
on Surrogacy Law Reform’ (Surrogacy UK, November 2015).
145 It is certainly arguable that the need for law reform arises because judicial decisions have unravelled the conditions in s 54
and those statutory rules no longer appear coherent in light of this case law. The reform process has been driven by the
judiciary, without the examination of overarching context that such fundamental reform requires. I would like to thank
one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this point.
146 Thirteenth Programme of Law Reform, Law Com No 377 (TSO, 2017), para 2.42, at p 21.
147 K Norrie, ‘English and Scottish adoption orders and British parental orders after surrogacy: welfare, competence and
judicial legislation’ [2017] CFLQ 93, at p 100.
148 P Bremner, ‘Surrogacy and Single Parents Following Re Z’ (2017) 21(2) Edinburgh Law Review 281, at p 286.
149 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, Cm 9314 (1984).
150 Ibid, para 2.11.
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reproductive scenario and to provide for the resulting family arrangement to conform as closely
as possible to a nuclear family model’.151 Thus, it is apparent that the promotion and
protection of the traditional nuclear family152 was influential in shaping the initial legislative
approach to determining legal parenthood in cases of assisted reproduction.153
Julie McCandless and Sally Sheldon have observed of the reforms of the 2008 Act, that, ‘the
model of family underlying these provisions was barely considered by the reformers at all, not
forming a core part of the reform project’.154 This lack of scrutiny suggests that the values
preferred in the 2008 Act’s determination of legal parenthood were not the result of an explicit,
conscious choice.155 Instead, the model of family continues to reflect that which consciously
underpinned the 1990 Act. While the reforms of the 2008 Act have widened the scope of legal
parenthood in cases of assisted reproduction to allow for the possibility of two legal parents of
the same sex,156 this has been done without fundamentally altering or challenging the
underlying basis of the provisions,157 which is the binary, two-parent model, based upon the
traditional, heterosexual, nuclear family. As Leanne Smith observes, ‘legal parenthood remains
an exclusive concept – albeit an exclusive concept that is now capable of embracing two parents
of the same sex – designed to shore up nuclear families against the disruptive potential of the
fragmentation of parenthood’.158 Therefore, in spite of its reforms, the policy underpinning the
2008 Act’s approach to the attribution of legal parenthood continues to be premised upon this
traditional, two-parent model.159
This model does not apply straightforwardly in cases of surrogacy, because as Fenton-Glynn
observes, ‘[t]he status provisions . . . were not designed with surrogacy in mind’.160 The distinct
issues raised by legal parenthood in cases of surrogacy are not dealt with explicitly by the 2008
Act’s provisions for determining legal parenthood, which instead employs one unified approach
to all cases of assisted reproduction.161 As a consequence, Emily Jackson has observed that,
‘[t]he Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act’s status provisions apply awkwardly and
inappropriately to surrogacy arrangements’.162 One reason for this awkwardness is that greater
factual complexity is introduced into the process of determining legal parenthood in cases of
151 S Sheldon, ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation of Reproductive Technologies’ (2005) 68(4) Modern Law Review
523, at 541.
152 The importance of the traditional family is also illustrated by the reference to ‘the need of that child for a father’ in s 13(5)
of the 1990 Act. For discussion of this controversial legislative provision, see, for example, G Douglas, ‘Assisted
Conception and the Welfare of the Child’ (1993) 46 Current Legal Problems 53 and E Jackson, ‘Conception and the
Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 65(2) Modern Law Review 176.
153 See further J Wallbank, ‘Reconstructing the HFEA 1990: is blood really thicker than water?’ [2004] CFLQ 387.
154 J McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family
Form’ (2010) 73(2) Modern Law Review 175, at p 182.
155 However, the Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryology (Draft) Bill, HL Paper 169, HC Paper 630 (August
2007), stated, at para 263: ‘Part 3 of the draft Bill seeks to take a new approach to parenthood, moving towards the
concept of parenthood as a legal responsibility rather than a biological relationship’, available at: www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtembryos/169/169.pdf.
156 Sections 42–48, which creates the possibility of legal parenthood for both members of a female same-sex couple in cases of
assisted reproduction and s 54, under which same-sex couples can apply for ‘parental orders’.
157 S Sheldon and R Collier, Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study (Hart, 2008) present an alternative analysis of the
2008 Act, suggesting that, at p 80: ‘[t]he fierce protection of the heterosexual nuclear family form entrenched in the 1990
legislation gives way to a more fluid and complex sense of familial relationships’.
158 L Smith, ‘Clashing symbols? Reconciling support for fathers and fatherless families after the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 2008’ [2010] CFLQ 46, at p 70.
159 Section 13(5) of the 1990 Act was amended by s 14(2) of the 2008 Act, replacing the reference to the ‘father’ with ‘the
need of that child for supportive parenting’. As with the other reforms of the 2008 Act, this linguistic change does not
necessarily affect the underlying centrality of the binary, two-parent model.
160 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘The regulation and recognition of surrogacy under English law: an overview of the case law’ [2015]
CFLQ 83, at p 84.
161 See, for example, R Fenton, S Heenan and J Rees, ‘Finally Fit For Purpose? The Human Fertilization and Embryology Act
2008’ (2010) 32(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 275.
162 E Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Hart, 2001), at p 283.
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surrogacy; where it is possible that, as Horsey identifies, ‘a child can have up to six potential
‘parents’: two gamete providers, the gestational/birth mother and her husband or partner (if she
has one) and the two intending parents, where these are different people. Notably this number
is only limited to six because the law is only prepared to recognise two parents, the number
could be greater were this not the case’.163 These complex factual circumstances that may be
present in cases of surrogacy sit uneasily within the unified approach to legal parenthood in
cases of assisted reproduction, due to the reliance upon the binary, two-parent model and
promotion of the nuclear family ideal.164 Surrogacy fits awkwardly within a framework that is
premised upon this exclusive two-parent model, because it introduces additional potential
‘parents’ into the ‘natural’ factual scenario.165 As Rachel Cook observes, ‘[a] major moral
concern in relation to these types of family formation is the fragmentation of parenthood. This
fragmentation is more explicit in surrogacy than any other reproductive option’.166 As a result
of this dominant model, in cases of surrogacy the intention of the parties is ignored in
determinations of legal parenthood at birth. Thus, the unified approach to the attribution of
legal parenthood in all cases of assisted reproduction has the problematic consequence in
surrogacy cases of creating legal results that can ignore both the genetic connections and the
intentions of the parties, at the time the surrogacy arrangement was made.167
The law’s attempt at a solution to the specific problems of the attribution of legal parenthood in
cases of surrogacy was to create parental orders. However, these orders continue to reflect the
two-parent model, allowing for legal parenthood to be transferred from the surrogate (and
potentially her husband) to the intended parents, rather than acknowledging the potential for
three (or more) ‘parental’ roles to exist simultaneously from birth. Moreover, when these orders
were created by section 30 of the 1990 Act they were explicitly designed to protect the
traditional nuclear family, because the orders were originally only available to married couples,
who represent the archetypical couple within the nuclear family.168 The provision creating
parental orders was inserted at a late stage of the legislative process, in response to a complaint
received by a backbench MP from constituents who had undertaken a surrogacy arrange-
ment169 and who objected to ‘having to adopt “their children” ’.170 The resulting provisions of
section 30 were ‘rapidly drafted’,171 in an attempt to recognise the specific issues and to
ameliorate some of the problematic consequences of the attribution of legal parenthood that
arise in cases of surrogacy. However, this was explicitly only available to those people (married
163 K Horsey, ‘Challenging presumptions: legal parenthood and surrogacy arrangements’ [2010] CFLQ 449, at p 453.
164 See, for example, J Wallbank, ‘Too Many Mothers? Surrogacy, Kinship and the Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10(3) Medical
Law Review 271.
165 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, Cm 9314 (1984), para 8.11, at p 45 states,
‘to introduce a third party into the process of procreation which should be confined to the loving partnership between two
people, is an attack on the value of the marital relationship’.
166 R Cook, ‘Donating Parenthood: Perspectives on Parenthood from Surrogacy and Gamete Donation’ in A Bainham, S Day
Sclater and M Richards (eds), What is a Parent?: A Socio-Legal Analysis (Hart, 1999), at p 122.
167 The clearest example relates to circumstances where a surrogate is married. As a result of s 33 and s 35 of the 2008 Act,
the surrogate will be the legal mother and her husband will be treated as the child’s legal father at birth (unless he has not
consented to the treatment); therefore, legal parenthood is attributed to a man with no genetic relationship to the child,
who has no intention of having any social relationship with that child in the future.
168 For sociological accounts of the ‘nuclear family’, see for example D Gittins, The Family in Question: Changing
Households and Familiar Ideologies (MacMillan, 2nd edn, 1993) and J Bernardes, Family Studies: An Introduction
(Routledge, 1997).
169 Their dispute with the local authority became Re W (Minors) (Surrogacy) [1991] 1 FLR 385, prior to the coming into
force of s 30 of the 1990 Act in November 1994.
170 The Brazier Report, ‘Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers Current Arrangements for Payments and Regulation’
(Department of Health, October 1998), para 3.12, at p 20, available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20130107105354/, www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_
4014373.pdf.
171 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘Outsourcing Ethical Dilemmas: Regulating International Surrogacy Arrangements’ (2016) 24(1)Medical
Review Law 59, at p 61.
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couples) who fit within the traditional, binary, two-parent model which underpinned the
overarching framework of the legislative regime. While the 2008 Act widened the scope of
those couples who can apply for a parental order, to include same-sex couples and unmarried
couples,172 this expansion did not include single applicants,173 and as set out above, the
underlying model of family was not challenged or altered in the course of the reform process.174
Therefore, given this legislative and policy background, the divergence between the decisions in
Re X and Re Z can be explained through the policy significance of the two-parent model within
the legislative regime, which is clearly reflected by the parliamentary language referred to in
Re Z.175 This is unsurprising because ‘parental orders’ were explicitly designed for only married
couples176 and the underlying model of the legislative regime for parenthood was not altered by
the reforms of the 2008 Act.177 The contrasting decisions of the judgments illustrate the
continuing significance of the two-parent model; in Re X and the subsequent cases considering
applications made outside the ‘time limit’, a ‘purposive’ or ‘liberal’ interpretation of the
statutory rule was employed to grant parental orders to ‘deserving’ two-parent families.
Whereas in Re Z, maintaining the strict rule that a parental order can only be applied for by
‘two people’ does not extend the scope of parental orders outside of the traditional, two-parent
nuclear family. Therefore, the disjuncture that is apparent between these judgments can be
explained and understood as reflecting the underlying policy significance of the two-parent
model to the legislative provisions concerning the attribution of legal parenthood in all cases of
assisted reproduction, and the continued promotion of this model by judicial language and
decision-making. However, while this underlying significance was explicit and uncontested in
1990, it is far from clear that this remains true, in spite of the approach taken by the President.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding my criticisms of the decision in Re X, set out above, it is apparent that
Munby P sought what he perceived as a ‘just’ outcome, based upon the best interests of the
child, in ignoring the clear statutory language of ‘must’, in section 54(3), and granting the
parental order. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that he did not adopt a similarly ‘just’
approach to the statutory language of section 54(1) in Re Z. The decision in Re Z is rendered
problematic because of the ‘liberal’ and ‘purposive’ approach taken in previous decisions
interpreting other conditions in section 54 of the 2008 Act; the decision in Re Z was not made
in a context-free vacuum. Intuitively it seems as if the outcome in both cases should be the
same. Either the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, meaning that parental orders
should not be granted unless the statutory conditions are all met and consequently the decision
in Re X is questionable.178 Or as a result of a combination of the 2010 Regulations making the
‘welfare of the child’ the court’s paramount consideration, a ‘liberal’ and ‘purposive’ approach
to statutory interpretation and section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, then the importance of
properly recognising the ‘status’ and ‘identity’ of the children has become the determinative
issue, meaning that parental orders should be granted in virtually all circumstances, absent ‘the
172 Section 54(2).
173 Section 54(1).
174 See, for example, J McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity of
the Sexual Family Form’ (2010) 73(2) Modern Law Review 175.
175 The statement, quoted above, of the Minister of State Dawn Primarolo MP, Hansard, HC Deb, col 249 (12 June 2008)
that ‘[t]he Government are still of the view that the magnitude of that means that it is best dealt with by a couple’.
176 Section 30(1) of the 1990 Act.
177 See further J Dewar, ‘The Normal Chaos of Family Law’ (1998) 61(4) Modern Law Review 467.
178 As well as the subsequent decisions on s 54(3), see, for example, AB v CT (Parental Order: Consent of Surrogate Mother)
[2015] EWFC 12, [2016] 1 FLR 41, the decision on s 54(4) and (5) in A v P (Surrogacy: Parental Order: Death of
Applicant) [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam), [2012] Fam 188, and the line of authority concerning ‘reasonable expenses’ in
s 54(8), see, for example, Re D and L (Surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631 (Fam), [2013] 2 FLR 275.
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clearest case of the abuse of public policy’,179 and consequently the decision in Re Z is
questionable. Thus, I argue that the divergent outcomes of these cases are problematic, because
they seemingly amount to an attempt by the judiciary to take both of these approaches
simultaneously in relation to different conditions within section 54, in an unconvincing manner
that has a highly contestable justification. This article offered the explanation that the
incoherence between the judgments can be partially understood as reflecting the continuing
policy significance of the binary, two-parent model and the traditional nuclear family within the
legal regulation of assisted reproduction and surrogacy in the 2008 Act.
Given that there is a growing consensus that the current legislative approach is problematic and
the welfare of the child is the court’s paramount consideration in determining applications for
parental orders, it is understandable that judges are seeking ‘creative’ solutions to achieve what
is perceived to be the ‘right’ result of granting the order. However, there are clearly limits to the
efficacy of such a judicially led approach to resolving these underlying legislative issues, as the
President’s decision in Re Z illustrates. Fenton-Glynn has previously commented that:
‘there is an urgent need to review the regulation of surrogacy, both in this country, and
internationally. Until this occurs, the courts will continue to have little choice but to stretch,
manipulate, or even disregard the statutory wording in order to achieve justice for the
child’.180
While I agree with the suggestion that the current legal regime regulating surrogacy is
unsatisfactory and in need of reform, I argue that the judgments considering the interpretation
of section 54 of the 2008 Act illustrate the problems caused by attempts at ‘reform’ led by the
judiciary. This is because such judicial ‘reform’ is inevitably piecemeal, somewhat contradictory
and necessarily lacking the required coherent underpinning purpose and philosophy. Horsey
observes that, ‘the law regulating surrogacy in the UK is increasingly out of date and failing to
adequately protect the best interests of children and families’.181 The contradictory decisions
and messages of the judgments in Re X and Re Z provide a clear illustration of the problems
with the current legal regime governing surrogacy and show the need for wholesale and
principled legislative reform of the regulation of surrogacy arrangements that the Law
Commission is now in the process of considering.
179 See, for example, Re L (A Child) (Surrogacy: Parental Order) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam), [2011] Fam 106.
180 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘The Difficulty of Enforcing Surrogacy Regulations’ (2015) 74 Cambridge Law Journal 34, at p 36. See
further A Alghrani and D Griffiths, ‘The regulation of surrogacy in the United Kingdom: the case for reform’ [2017] CFLQ
165.
181 K Horsey, ‘Fraying at the Edges: UK Surrogacy Law in 2015’ (2016) 24(4) Medical Law Review 608, at p 608.
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